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Fundamental Changes in the LLC:
A Study in Path-Divergence and Convergence

Joan MacLeod Heminway

1.

INTRODUCTION

As most commentators note, architects of the law governing the limited liability
company business form (LLC) in the United States (a relatively late entrant in the
U.S. business entity race) could, and did, look to the law of partnerships, limited
partnerships, and corporations in formulating LLC law. The Revised Uniform
Partnership Act (RUPA) was, rather transparently, the original basis for many of the
statutory rules in the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA). The RUPA
codified partnership norms that focus on the co-equal consent of partners for the
entity’s formation, maintenance, wind-up, and termination. As a result, the ULLCA’s
RUPA foundation gave the LLC form, in a simple, direct way, the attributes needed to
secure pass-through treatment for the entity under federal income tax law while
providing limited liability to owners under state entity law, a major driving force
behind the LLC. Specifically, under the pre-existing federal income tax regulations,
an unincorporated business entity enjoyed pass-through tax treatment if it lacked at
least two of four core characteristics of corporations: (1) continuity of life, (2)
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centralization of management, (3) limited liability and (4) free transferability of
interests.1

However, because aspects of the LLC deviated from general partnership law, limited
partnership and corporate law policy also have played a role in the creation of LLC
rules, and limited partnership and corporate doctrine was grafted onto the RUPA
base to some extent in creating the RULLCA. As a result, courts have used both
partnership and corporate law principles in deciding LLC controversies that require
statutory interpretation or gap-filling. Moreover, the doctrinal rules relating to LLCs
have changed over the years, including in response to developing decisional law and
federal income tax law changes in 1997 that allowed for more liberal pass-through
treatment for unincorporated business entities. As a result, the ULLCA had—and
each successor uniform act has continued to have—a palpable, albeit tentative and
shifting, hybrid quality about it.

Many aspects of this crossbred existence have generated significant scholarly
attention. In particular, issues relating to limited liability (including veil piercing),
taxation, management and control (including fiduciary duties), and the overall
flexibility of internal governance rules have been well analyzed in the literature—
and rightly so. These are important doctrinal concerns, and they are considerations
central to the formation and day-to-day operation of a business organized as an LLC.

See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1980); see also Morrissey v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
1
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Issues relating to fundamental changes in LLCs, however—matters such as
amendments to organizational documents, mergers, conversions, domestications,
and dissolutions—have received measurably less consideration. While they are
regular occurrences in the lifecycle of a firm, they are not in front of an LLC’s
management or legal counsel every day. Having said that, they are critically
important to the law governing LLCs, especially in transformative times.
Accordingly, this chapter reviews the current state of fundamental change doctrine
in the LLC form in the United States, collects and describes key observations on the
current (and continually evolving) U.S. laws governing these important transactions,
and draws related summary conclusions.

2.

A BRIEF DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW

By the end of the 20th century, every state in the union had introduced an LLC
statute of one form or another. The first uniform LLC act in the United States,
ULLCA, was formalized in 1996, four years after the drafting of the Prototype
Limited Liability Company Act (PLLCA) by a working group of the American Bar
Association’s Committee on LLCs, Partnerships and Unincorporated Entities. LLC
law continued to develop rapidly through state legislatures in its wake. As a result,
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted a new
version of the uniform act, the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Act (RULLCA), in
2006. Innovations continued. In 2011, in response to significant changes in LLC law
introduced in Delaware, the Revised Prototype Limited Liability Company Act

3
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Editorial Board of the LLCs, Partnerships and Unincorporated Entities Committee of
the American Bar Association introduced a revised Prototype Limited Liability
Company Act (RPLLCA). State LLC laws are at varied stages of development and
include assorted provisions from these uniform and prototype acts, as well as rules
individually crafted to meet specific state policy needs.

The introduction of the series LLC has been an important, complex innovation of
state LLC law. In states adopting Delaware-style series LLC provisions, LLC series
are treated for most purposes as separate entities within a single LLC entity.
Delaware’s law serves as the model for this type of LLC, and its statement of this
general rule reads as follows:

A series . . . may carry on any lawful business, purpose or activity, whether or
not for profit, with the exception of the business of banking . . . . Unless
otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement, a series . . . shall
have the power and capacity to, in its own name, contract, hold title to assets
(including real, personal and intangible property), grant liens and security
interests, and sue and be sued.2

Other states have implemented their own series provisions in their statutes. Some
deviate from the Delaware model and most rely on contract (statutorily authorized
provisions in, for example, an LLC operating agreement or limited liability company
2

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215 (West 2014).
4
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agreement), at least to some extent, to formalize the specific rights inuring to those
holding interests in the series. Accordingly, it is difficult to generalize governance
rules in this area across multiple jurisdictions and firms. The series LLC is a
relatively new statutory addition and has not yet been widely tested practically or
judicially, including in the area of fundamental change transactions. It remains,
however, an area to watch.

Notwithstanding series LLC doctrine and other examples of recognized individuality
in state approaches to LLC law, there are certain generalizable standards and trends
in LLC law concerning fundamental organizational changes. These standards and
trends are summarized in the sections below. They highlight a number of important
themes and reveal undeniable patterns of interest to businesses and their legal
counsel.

The summary offered below focuses on certain key aspects of the law relating to
fundamental change transactions. Fundamental change doctrine in LLC law, as in
corporate law, comprises legal rules that focus on the nature of transactional
authority. Specifically, fundamental change transactions are those that are so basic
to the firm that non-manager owners are given an element of control—a right to
vote or consent. The summary of fundamental change doctrine in the LLC context
that follows therefore focuses on the approval rights of LLC members over basic
structural transactions.

5
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Amendments to Organizational Documents

LLC organizational documents typically consist of a chartering document—the
document that, when filed with the office of the secretary of state of a state,
constitutes the LLC as a legal entity—and an agreement among the members
(owners) of the LLC as to the governance rules by which the LLC will operate. The
labels for LLC organizational documents have evolved over the years. For example,
the ULLCA and PLLCA both use the term “articles of organization” to describe the
LLC charter and “operating agreement” to describe the governance agreement
among members. However, the RULLCA uses “certificate of organization,” and the
RPLLCA uses “certificate of formation,” to refer to the LLC charter. In addition, while
the RULLCA continues to refer to the governance agreement among members as an
operating agreement, the RPLLCA refers to that governance agreement as a “limited
liability company agreement.” State statutes predictably employ a similarly varied
set of terms to refer to LLC organizational documents, most of them using the terms
provided in the prototype or uniform acts.

Amendments to these LLC organizational documents enjoy a special legal status. As
a general matter, the consent of all members is required to amend LLC
organizational documents, at least by default. Section 404(c) of the ULLCA, Sections
407(b)(4) and (c)(4) & (5) of the RULLCA, and Section 406(c)(1) of the RPLLCA, for
example, all provide for unanimous consent for amendments to the articles or
certificate and operating agreement. In some cases, these statutes rely on language

6
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providing for approval by all members of any matter outside the ordinary course of
business of the LLC. Unanimity by default is the rule in some state LLC statutes.3

However, other variations also are common and seem to be proliferating. Some state
LLC statutes allow the required consent of members to be varied in the chartering
document. Other state LLC statutes specify the required vote (typically majority, but
sometimes supermajority) of members unless the charter or governance agreement
provides for a different—sometimes only a greater—vote.4 Some state LLC statutes
provide for different votes based on the subject matter of the amendment, with
more fundamental, core changes requiring a unanimous vote and other changes
requiring a majority vote.5 Some states allow managers in manager-managed LLCs
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-209 (West 2014) (“An amendment to the
articles of organization is invalid unless approved by all of the members or in such
other manner as may be provided in the operating agreement”); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 450.4603 (West 2014) (requiring in a certificate of amendment “[a]
statement that the amendment or amendments were approved by the unanimous
vote of all of the members entitled to vote or by a majority in interest if an operating
agreement authorizes amendment of the articles of organization by majority vote.”);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.444 (West 2014) (“Except as otherwise provided in ORS
63.441 [regarding amendments that can be approved by a manager or managers of
a manager-managed LLC] or in the articles of organization or any operating
agreement, all amendments to the articles of organization or any operating
agreement must be approved unanimously by the members.”).
4 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1318 (West 2014) (providing for a majority vote of
the members to approve all amendments to the articles or operating agreement,
unless otherwise provided in the articles or a written operating agreement); N.Y.
LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 213 (McKinney 2014) (“Except as provided in the operating
agreement, an amendment of the articles of organization shall be authorized by at
least a majority in interest of the members entitled to vote thereon.”).
5 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2020 (West 2014) (providing for a majority vote
of the members for approval of an amendment to the articles of organization or
operating agreement, subject to certain exceptions where a unanimous vote is
required, unless in either case a different vote is provided in the LLC’s article or
operating agreement—a written operating agreement being required to vary the
3
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(LLCs in which the management function is performed by one or more persons, who
need not be members, named or designated in the manner set forth in the statute)
to adopt limited, clerical charter amendments (rather than requiring that members
consent to those amendments).6 Some states—most notably Delaware—treat
amendments of the operating, limited liability company, or other governing
agreement as a matter of contract by default.7

Mergers, Conversions, and Domestications

Doctrinal rules relating to LLC mergers, conversions, and domestications also vary
and have evolved significantly over the years. The trend has been toward more
types of transactions between and among more and more forms of domestic and
foreign business entity. This liberalization generally tracks and follows on
developments in corporate doctrine and is illustrated well by the progression of the
prototype and uniforms acts.

unanimity requirement); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-204(c) (West 2014) (requiring
approval for an amendment of the LLC’s articles by all members, except for an
amendment changing the LLC’s name or making other specified ministerial
changes).
6 See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 180/5-15 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.441.
7 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-302(e) (“If a limited liability company agreement
provides for the manner in which it may be amended, including by requiring the
approval of a person who is not a party to the limited liability company agreement
or the satisfaction of conditions, it may be amended only in that manner or as
otherwise permitted by law . . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-204(c) (“Any
amendment to an LLC's operating agreement shall be approved by the method
provided in its LLC documents. If the LLC documents do not provide for the method
by which an operating agreement may be amended, all of the members shall
approve any amendment to the operating agreement.”).
8
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2504209

Section 904 of the ULLCA provided for mergers of a limited liability company with
or into a domestic or a foreign limited liability company or companies, or one or
more domestic or foreign corporations, partnerships, limited partnerships, or other
entities. For a domestic LLC that is a party to the merger, the plan of merger must be
approved by all of the LLC’s members or by the number or percentage of members
required in the operating agreement. Conversions, however, were only covered in
the ULLCA in a limited way. The relevant provision, Section 902 of the ULLCA, only
permits conversions of domestic partnerships and domestic limited partnerships
into LLCs. The conversion requires the unanimous approval of the partners or
approval in accordance with the terms of the partnership agreement.
Domestications are not covered at all in the ULLCA.

What a difference ten years makes . . . . The adoption of the RULLCA reflected
significant changes in the doctrine relating to organic transactions—mergers,
conversions, and domestications—that constitute fundamental change transactions.
Article 10 of the RULLCA provides broadly for LLC mergers, conversions, and
domestications. Under Sections 1003(a), 1007(a), and 1011(a) of the RULLCA,
respectively: all members of an LLC that is party to a merger must consent to the
plan of merger; all members of a converting LLC must consent to the plan of
conversion; and all members of a domesticating LLC must consent to a plan of
domestication. Sections 1002(a) and 1006(a) of the RPLLCA carry forward the same
unanimous approval rules set forth in the RULLCA, but Article 10 of the RPLLCA

9
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classifies a domestication transaction as a type of conversion. Accordingly, the
RPLLCA only references mergers and conversions.

Individual states have adopted many different versions of these rules, customized to
reflect unique provisions and policy attributes. A number of states do not have
domestication provisions in their LLC law; some of these jurisdictions have plans to
add domestications to their statutes. In addition, state legislatures have continued to
innovate from the evolving rules represented in the uniform and prototype LLC acts.
Florida, for example, recently added an “interest exchange” transaction to the list of
organic transactions permitted to be entered into by LLCs.8 Under the new Florida
LLC law, interest exchange transactions are the LLC equivalent of the corporate
statutory share exchange transaction (an alternative form of business combination
provided for in Section 11.03 of the Model Business Corporation Act). Also,
Wyoming, in the 2010 revisions to its LLC act, continued to provide for both
continuances (which operate like RULLCA domestications) and domestications (in
which a foreign LLC is not required to abandon its foreign domicile but is also
permitted to validly exist under Wyoming law).9 Among states that provide for
domestications, some provide a narrow meaning to the term “domestication,”
defining it as only applying to applications of non-U.S. entities for continued
existence under domestic LLC law.10 Other states construe domestication
transactions more broadly as repatriations to the state of any U.S. or non-U.S. firm
See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 605.1031-.1036 (West 2014).
See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-29-1010 & 17-29-1012 (West 2014).
10 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-212.
8
9

10
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2504209

organized under the laws of another jurisdiction.11 Tennessee, which is unique in
recognizing a director-managed form of LLC in addition to the more standard
manager-managed and member-managed forms, requires the majority approval of
directors or managers, as applicable, and members for “[t]he sale, lease, transfer or
other disposition by an LLC of all, or substantially all, of its property and assets not
in the usual and regular course of business.”12

Most strikingly, however, state statutes, unlike the prototype and uniform LLC acts,
have begun to eschew unanimous member consent requirements in favor of
majority approval requirements, especially for mergers.13 Delaware law provides
for approval of a merger plan “by members who own more than 50 percent of the
then current percentage or other interest in the profits of the domestic limited

See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-1012 (West 2014).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-705.
13 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 605.1023(1)(a) & 605.1043(1)(a) (requiring approval
for mergers and conversions by a majority-in-interest of all members with voting
rights); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 92A.150 (West 2014) (“A plan of merger, conversion
or exchange involving a domestic limited-liability company must be approved by
members who own a majority of the interests in the current profits of the company
then owned by all of the members”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:156 (2014)
(“Unless the operating agreement provides otherwise, a limited liability company
that is a party to a proposed merger shall approve the merger agreement by
majority vote of the members”); id. § 304-C:150 (“If the limited liability company
agreement of the limited liability company referred to in paragraph II does not
specify the manner of authorizing a statutory conversion of the limited liability
company or a merger that involves the limited liability company as a constituent
party and does not prohibit a statutory conversion of the limited liability company,
the statutory conversion shall be authorized by majority vote of the members of the
limited liability company”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-702 & 704 (providing for a
majority vote of managers or directors, as applicable, and a majority vote of
members to approve a merger or the conversion of a domestic LLC to another
entity).
11
12
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liability company owned by all of the members.”14 Conversions and non-U.S.
domestications are subject to approval “in the manner provided for by the
document, instrument, agreement or other writing, as the case may be, governing
the internal affairs” of the converting or domesticating entity “and the conduct of its
business” or, as appropriate, by applicable law.15 This shift has brought with it the
addition of dissenters’ (appraisal) rights under certain state LLC laws.16 Delaware’s
LLC law authorizes contractual appraisal rights.17 Other states have followed.18
These provisions are relatively new and their value has not yet been fully
demonstrated.

The overall trajectory of modifications to state LLC merger, conversion, and
domestication statutes has been toward enhanced flexibility as to both the form of
the transaction and the organizational form of the transactions participants. This
trend has principally been executed through the tailored grafting of nomenclature
and processes from corporate laws onto LLC statutory frameworks. States that are
moving away from requiring unanimous member consent for organic transactions
like mergers, conversions, and domestications also are largely following corporate
models.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-209(b).
Id. §§ 18-212(c)(6) & 18-214(h).
16 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 605.1061 – 605.1072; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 92a.300 –
92a.500; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-C:160 – C:172.
17 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-210.
18 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-706.
14
15
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Yet, the corporatization of fundamental change rules does not portend the
corporatization of LLC law as a whole. A 2013 Delaware Chancery Court case
reviewing a post-conversion claim for advancement and indemnification from an
LLC illustrates this point. The LLC was the successor of a corporation in a
conversion. The claimant was a director and chairman of the predecessor
corporation and a member of the governing board and chairman of the successor
LLC. The claim for indemnification related to actions taken by the claimant during
the time that he was working for the predecessor corporation. The Chancery Court
denied the plaintiff’s claim for advancement and indemnification because the LLC’s
operating agreement did not authorize the advancement and indemnification.

The change of the entity from Ashbridge Corporation to Ashbridge LLC was a
fundamental change in identity. The advancement and indemnification
scheme of Ashbridge Corporation's bylaws was re-written into contractual
terms in Ashbridge LLC's operating agreement in a manner that substantially
altered the rights and obligations of the parties. . . . The Court will therefore
not impose retroactive obligations on a limited liability company when the
plain language of its operating agreement would not permit predecessor or
affiliate liability and when the indemnification schemes of the predecessor
corporation and successor limited liability company differ.19

Grace v. Ashbridge LLC, CIV.A. 8348-VCN, 2013 WL 6869936 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31,
2013) (footnotes omitted) (citing to Bernstein v. TractManager, Inc., 953 A.2d 1003
(Del. Ch. 2007) for support).
19
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Thus, as this opinion illustrates, there may be significant potential traps for the
unwary that emanate from the relative merger, conversion, and domestication
freedom permitted in the LLC context.

Dissolutions

Dissolution rules in the LLC were originally derived from a partnership model in
order to assure pass-through treatment for LLCs under then applicable federal
income tax law. Specifically, partnership norms that provided for dissolution in the
event of the dissociation of a partner from the firm were incorporated into the LLC
form to avoid the continuity of existence attribute of the corporate form, since passthrough income tax status under pre-existing federal law was linked in part to
limited (as opposed to perpetual) entity existence. Once pass-through tax status was
de-linked from continuity of interest and other core corporate attributes, LLCs were
free to innovate toward individualized contractual dissolution events that allow for
perpetual existence.

Section 801 of the ULLCA, introduced almost coincident with these federal tax law
changes, edged toward that objective. Under the ULLCA, while the separation
(dissociation) of an LLC member from the LLC has the potential to dissolve the LLC,
dissolution is not an automatic effect of LLC member dissociation. Although
members can apply to a court for dissolution under specified circumstances set
forth in the ULLCA (frustration of the LLC’s economic purpose, the conduct of

14
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another member making continuation of the business with that member reasonably
impracticable, the reasonable impracticability of conducting the company's business
in conformity with the articles of organization and the operating agreement, and
illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial managerial action), for the
most part, dissolution events can be set forth in or varied in the LLC operating
agreement.

RULLCA and the RPLLCA retain this relative freedom of contract and push further
toward corporate dissolution rules, including in the case of RULLCA those applied
by legislatures and courts for principal use in the close corporation context. For
example, Section 701 of the RULLCA adds both the consent of all of the members as
a default dissolution event and also an express provision for an alternative (nondissolution) remedy for illegal, fraudulent, or oppressive managerial conduct. The
latter allows for buyouts of member interests on a showing of managerial
oppression without triggering dissolution of the firm as provided for in Section
14.34 of the Model Business Corporation Act. The RPLLCA provides for only five
simple, straightforward dissolution triggers: (1) an event or circumstance set forth
in the limited liability company agreement, (2) the consent of all the members, (3)
with the requisite consent, LLC delinquency that is not cured over a three-year
period, (4) ninety days after dissociation of the last remaining member, and (5) on
application by a member, a court order because it is not reasonably practicable to
carry on the LLC’s activities in accordance with the limited liability company
agreement.

15
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Like the RULLCA, some state laws combine partnership dissolution and dissolutionrelated provisions from the RUPA (including, for example, dissolution events that
include member dissociation and buyouts) with corporate law dissolution concepts
(including, for example, authority to dissolve an LLC or authorize a member buyout
based on managerial oppression, detailed provisions on other forms of judicial
dissolution, and rules providing for administrative dissolution).20 Some of these
state LLC laws provide that dissolutions require the approval of a majority, rather
than all, of the members of the LLC.21 Delaware law provides for five dissolution
events: (1) the time specified in the limited liability company agreement
(acknowledging expressly that the LLC otherwise has a perpetual existence by
default), (2) the happening of events specified in the limited liability company
agreement, (3) “unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement,
upon the affirmative vote or written consent of the members of the limited liability
company . . . by members who own more than 2/3 of the then-current percentage or
other interest in the profits of the limited liability company owned by all of the
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-801 – 80-813 (West 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
605.0701-.0717; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-C:98 – C:105-A & §§ 304-C:127 – C:146;
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-38 – 53-19-46; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-249-601 – 622; WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-29-601 – 701(a)(v)(B).
21 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:129 (“Unless the operating agreement
provides otherwise, a limited liability company shall be dissolved by majority vote
of the members.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-39 (West) (“A limited liability company is
dissolved . . . except as otherwise provided in the articles of organization or an
operating agreement, upon the written consent of members having a majority share
of the voting power of all members”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-603(b)(2) (“If the
proposed dissolution of the LLC is approved at a meeting of the members by a
majority vote, or such other vote as may be provided for in the LLC documents, the
LLC shall be dissolved”).
20
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members,” (4) with certain exceptions, when there are no remaining members, and
(5) by judicial decree on application “whenever it is not reasonably practicable to
carry on the business in conformity with a limited liability company agreement.”22

3.

RESULTING OBSERVATIONS

The history and current state of fundamental change doctrine in the LLC form of
business association give rise to a number of important observations. Several of
these merit a brief commentary. These observations are set forth below grouped
under three principal subject matter headings: the influence and interplay of
corporate law and freedom of contract, vested rights and fundamental changes, and
legislative drafting choices.

Influence and Interplay of Corporate Law and Freedom of Contract

No accurate summary of fundamental change doctrine in LLC law could fail to
highlight two key drivers of the development of that doctrine: corporate law rules
(noted at the outset in this chapter) and principles of freedom of contract. These
two influences on fundamental changes under LLC law are both predictable and
potentially contradictory. As a result, policy considerations played out in the courts
and the legislature have been and continue to be important to LLC fundamental
change doctrine.
22

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-801 & 18-802.
17
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Corporate law is both familiar and well developed. Those who formerly organized
corporations and are familiar with corporate norms now often choose the LLC form
for their businesses because of its inherent flexibility. Repeat players in the entity
formation game—business lawyers included—are accustomed to corporate norms
and understand the ways in which those norms solve recurrent, common problems
in business entity formation and maintenance. Fundamental changes in LLCs
resemble and raise questions similar to those raised by fundamental changes in the
corporate context. It is unsurprising, and perhaps even rote and efficient, that the
judiciary and legislators look to solve these problems, including those involving LLC
fundamental changes, with the time-tested (albeit sometimes imperfect) solutions
offered by corporate law. Tennessee LLC law has gone so far as to provide expressly
for a director-managed form of LLC that incorporates corporate law structures and
norms into LLC law in their entirety.23

The trend away from unanimous consent, especially as an immutable rule,
illustrates the influence of corporate law. In an entity of any size, unanimous
consent may be difficult to obtain. A business entity’s inability to amend its
chartering document or governance agreement, to obtain approval of a business
combination or form or domicile change, or to dissolve, liquidate, and terminate its
existence distracts management and imposes weighty costs on operations that
decrease the value of the business unnecessarily. Corporate law had already
23

See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-401(c) & (d), 402(c) & (d), and 403(i).
18
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traveled this path by providing for majority and supermajority votes in these
circumstances, balanced by other governance rules that protected or compensated
shareholders (notably, in specific cases, fiduciary duties of the majority to the
minority, entire fairness review for cash-out mergers, and appraisal rights for
dissenting shareholders). LLC law has looked to and incorporated many of these
same rules.24

Dissolution provides another good example of the effects of corporate law on LLC
doctrine. The description of legislative changes provided in the preceding part of the
chapter belies an interest in using corporate law as a foundation to evolving LLC
dissolution doctrine. But courts also have contributed to this corporatization.

Specifically, some courts applying and construing the original RUPA partnershipbased dissolution schemes compellingly analogized closely held corporations to
closely held LLCs—entities, in each case, operated and controlled by a small number
of members, often comprising friends and family. These courts interpreted and filled
gaps in LLC statutes in a manner consistent with corporate doctrine, including by
ordering dissolution when it had not been requested as a remedy or fashioning
alternative remedies when dissolution had been requested as a remedy. The
See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 16-18 (regarding statutory institution and
facilitation of LLC appraisal rights); Allen v. Devon Energy Holdings, L.L.C., 2012 Tex.
App. LEXIS 2110, at *87 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. Mar. 9, 2012) (recognizing a
fiduciary duty of the majority to the minority under Texas LLC law);.Anderson v.
Wilder, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003) (recognizing
a fiduciary duty of the majority to the minority under Tennessee LLC law); Brazil v.
Rickerson, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1097, 1099 (W.D. Mo. 2003) (recognizing a
fiduciary duty of the majority to the minority under Missouri LLC law).
24

19
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2504209

opinions in these cases note circumstances substantially similar to those underlying
court determinations made under corporate law and apply corporate law rules.25

An accompanying trend in LLC law toward freedom of contract is sometimes at odds
with the movement toward incorporating corporate law principles into LLC law.
Partnership law under the RUPA places heavy emphasis on the contractual relations
of the partners. Under the RUPA, with minor exception, the partnership agreement
controls the relations between and among partners and between partners and the
partnership. Corporate doctrine is a very detailed, rich body of law that includes
comprehensive substantive and procedural rules. Most of these rules are default
rules rather than immutable rules, but corporate law tends to employ majoritarian
default rules rather than more tailored, bespoke principles. LLC law’s origins in
partnership law norms responded in part to a perceived need for more flexibility
and customization than is provided in corporate law. The preservation and
enhancement of freedom of contract principles in LLC law tends to create some
tension with the increasing influence of corporate law on LLC law.

Delaware is the leading and classic example of a state that has more frequently
chosen to evolve its law toward increased freedom of contract, although other
jurisdictions have adopted some of Delaware’s specific pro-contract rules. Delaware
LLC law serves as a primary model for the RPLLCA, which has a decidedly
See, e.g., Dickson v. Rehmke, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874 (3d Dist. 2008); Kirksey v.
Grohmann, 754 N.W.2d 825 (S.D. 2008).
25
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contractarian tilt. The statutory law in Delaware expressly incorporates a freedom
of contract objective by articulating a policy “to give the maximum effect to the
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability
company agreements.”26 Other states also have adopted this express statutory
norm.27

The legislature has spoken, and the Delaware courts understand their marching
orders. The Delaware case on post-conversion advancement and indemnification
described earlier in the chapter relies heavily on notions of freedom of contract, for
example.28 In another case, the Delaware Chancery Court denied an LLC member’s
request for judicial dissolution based on the court’s interpretation of the LLC’s
governance agreement.

I have found that Section 2.2 of the LLC Agreement applies generally to
exclude all rights associated with membership not required by law or
expressly granted in the LLC Agreement. Because a right to judicial
dissolution is not required by law or expressly granted in the LLC Agreement,
and because reading the Agreement as a whole it is clear that the parties

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b).
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7662 (West 2014) (“The policy of the Kansas Revised
Limited Liability Company Act . . . is to give the maximum effect to the principle of
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of operating agreements.”); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 275.003(1) (West 2014) (“It shall be the policy of the General Assembly
through this chapter to give maximum effect to the principles of freedom of contract
and the enforceability of operating agreements.”).
28 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
26
27
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meant to exclude any right to judicial dissolution, I find that the Plaintiff does
not have a right to seek a dissolution . . . .29

That trial court judgment, affirmed by the Supreme Court, illustrates the triumph of
contract law over corporate principles applicable to closely held entities that have
been applied, as earlier noted, by courts in other states.

In all jurisdictions, courts must determine the extent to which statutory provisions,
including those imported from corporate law, foreclose the exercise of freedom of
contract by LLC members. Often, the job is made more difficult by a lack of clear
policy directives from the legislature. In those circumstances, general common law
norms tend to form the basis of the courts’ judgments. One scholar in the area
describes this environment in a compelling way. Her words in this regard are worth
repeating here.

The developing strains of business entity governance hold the promise of
promoting the interest in contractual freedom while, at the same time,
balancing the important need for minimum standards to protect legitimate
expectations of fair and equitable conduct on the part of one's business
partners. The contractarian model should acknowledge the need for and
Huatuco v. Satellite Healthcare, CV 8465-VCG, 2013 WL 6460898 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9,
2013), aff'd, 93 A.3d 654 (Del. 2014); see also, e.g., R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe
Run Valley Farms, LLC, CIV.A. 3803-CC, 2008 WL 3846318 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008).
.
29
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importance of such mandatory minimum standards to govern business
relationships.

Regardless of how courts articulate their judicial tests, reverence for the
written contract must be tempered with the recognition that judicial review
is a good and essential thing, as is a mandatory core of acceptable manager
and/or member conduct. It has been said that the “defining tension” in
corporate governance today is the tension between deference to directors'
decisions and the scope of judicial review. In this debate, I have suggested
that the uncertainty of the law, and the corresponding specter of judicial
intervention, are not unfortunate consequences to be avoided by the creation
of a perfect statutory phrase or judicial test. Rather, judicial review is the
healthy price and the all-important force that deters overreaching and
enables the application of behavioral constraints within the context of our
contractual scheme of self-governance.30

This quoted passage identifies statutory and common law elements of LLC
governance, including especially the existence and application of fiduciary duties in
the LLC context, as central, foundational standards that courts use in mediating the
tension between standardized entity law norms and contractual freedom. The

Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the
Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1654 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
30
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quoted passage suggests that this judicial oversight is both constant and beneficial
as a check on opportunistic behavior in business entities.

However, there is some sentiment favoring and movement toward making fiduciary
duties purely contractual or fully waivable. Delaware LLC law, for example, allows
for the full customization of fiduciary duties in the limited liability agreement but
also provides that the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing
may not be eliminated.31 New York law also permits the waiver of fiduciary duty in
LLCs.32 The implementation of rules of this kind will change the role that judicial
enforcement of fiduciary duties has played in adjusting the equities among business
venturers participating in LLCs.

Vested Rights and Fundamental Changes

Ownership interests—member interests—in LLCs are personal property. Initial LLC
rules requiring unanimous member consent for fundamental changes derived from
the belief that an LLC member, as a business owner, has a vested property right in
his, her, or its ownership interest. The recognition of the vested rights doctrine visà-vis fundamental change transactions, however, imbued minority ownership
interests with hold-up value that had the capacity to foster inefficiencies and
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) & (e). In 2013, the Delaware legislature clarified
that default fiduciary duties do, in fact, exist under Delaware LLC law, a matter that,
together with fiduciary duty waivers, had been a litigable issue. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 18-1104; Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012);
Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649 (2012) (Del. Ch. 2012).
32 See Pappas v. Tzolis, 20 N.Y.3d 228 (2012).
31
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stagnate the firm. The summary of fundamental change law in the LLC context
provided earlier in the chapter demonstrates that few fundamental changes
currently require unanimous consent. LLC law has moved away from the
recognition of vested rights that require the unanimous consent of members for the
approval of fundamental change transactions.

Some state legislatures have made this choice quite explicitly by including a
renunciation of vested rights in their LLC statutes. For example, Utah law generally
provides that, “[e]xcept as may otherwise be expressly provided in the articles of
organization or operating agreement, a member has no vested property right
resulting from any provision in the articles of organization, including any provision
relating to management, control, capital structure, purpose, duration of the
company, or entitlement to distributions.”33

Some states make more specific express provision on the lack of vested rights of LLC
members. Tennessee law offers an example of this approach. Tennessee’s original
LLC law (which continues to exist in parallel with its revised LLC Act) provides that
an LLC member “does not have a vested property right resulting from any provision
in the articles or operating agreement, including provisions relating to management,

UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-407(2) (West 2014); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
275.003(6) (“No member or other person shall have a vested property right
resulting from any provision of the operating agreement which may not be modified
by its amendment or as otherwise permitted by law.”).
33
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control, capital structure, distribution entitlement or purpose or duration of the
LLC.”34 Virginia law includes a similar provision.35

In a rudimentary sense, the developments in LLC law relating to the vested rights
doctrine exemplify the overall evolution of LLC law. Specifically, the decline of
unanimous consent provisions—especially mandatory ones—and the abandonment
of the vested rights doctrine in LLC fundamental changes manifest both the
comparable evolution in corporate law and notions of freedom of contract. Business
owners that choose to organize their firm as an LLC understand that the state can
alter LLC law and that, consistent with that law as in effect from time to time, they
have the ability to agree around a variety of statutory default rules, including many
of those relating to fundamental changes. Although other aspects of LLC law
(notably, fiduciary duties, the obligation of good faith and fair dealing, and
oppression relief in the dissolution setting) continue to protect minority interests in
the fundamental change environment, vested property rights no longer provide that
protection under most state LLC acts.

Legislative Drafting Choices

The history and current state of LLC fundamental change doctrine offer legislatures
the motive and opportunity to create more streamlined, coherent, user-friendly
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-209-101(b).
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1014.E. (“A member of a limited liability company does not
have a vested property right resulting from any provision of the articles of
organization.”).
34
35
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statutes governing LLCs and business entities more generally. In particular,
similarities in filing processes, the liberalization of organic transactions to allow for
mergers, conversions, and domestications in and among all statutory business
forms, and the adoption of significant corporate law norms in LLC law fairly beg for
rationalization. Commentators have been suggesting consonant changes to entity
law since the 1990s.

The bar undertook to create legislative change momentum. The American Bar
Association established a Business Law Ad Hoc Committee on Entity Rationalization
in 2001. In 2002, the committee released the Model Inter-Entity Transactions Act
(MITA), which focused on simplifying statutory entity rules relating to fundamental
changes. The MITA was later combined with a similar initiative undertaken by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the Uniform Entity
Transactions Act), resulting in the publication of and subsequent revisions to the
Model Entity Transactions Act (META). The advent and transformation of LLC law—
and especially the fundamental change provisions—were strong motivations for
these projects.

A few state legislatures have begun to undertake the task of revising, consolidating,
and generally simplifying their business entity statutes. The development of
fundamental change doctrine and, more particularly, the evolution of the law
governing organic transactions, have been catalysts for those legislative initiatives.
Some state initiatives focus only on reorganizing the law applicable to organic
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transactions. Other states have incorporated broader changes in corporate
governance rules in their reform efforts. Although the approaches (like the rules
they incorporate) vary from state to state, several different ways of approaching the
relevant legislative drafting have emerged.

Traditionally, all of the fundamental change rules for each form of business entity
were located in the statute for that particular business entity. In other words, the
rules for amendments to organizational documents, mergers, conversions,
domestications, and dissolutions for LLCs in any individual state were located solely
in the state’s LLC act. That remains true in most states.

However, a few states have adopted “junction box” statutes. In these states, the
common substantive and procedural rules for organic transactions are collected in a
separate act among the business entity statutes of the state. Alabama, Colorado,
Connecticut, and Nevada and are four states that have adopted a “junction box”
approach. The META also represents a version of this approach. In each case, the
fundamental change provisions in individual entity statutes within the adopting
state are preserved to some extent despite the adoption of a separate statute
governing these transactions. This aspect of junction box statutes limits their value
as simplification measures in that practitioners may need to look at two or more
separate laws—the junction box statute and the statutes governing the individual
entity or entities subject to the action.
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Texas has taken a related but distinct approach that addresses this inefficiency to
some extent. The Texas law expressly articulates its purpose: “to make the law
encompassed by this code more accessible and understandable by: (1) rearranging
the statutes into a more logical order; (2) employing a format and numbering
system designed to facilitate citation of the law and to accommodate future
expansion of the law; (3) eliminating repealed, duplicative, expired, executed, and
other ineffective provisions; and (4) restating the law in modern American English
to the greatest extent possible.”36 To achieve these aims, Texas organizes all of its
business entity laws under a comprehensive business organizations code. The code
begins with a title that incorporates consolidated fundamental change rules and
other provisions generally applicable to all forms of business entity. The individual
entity laws are separate titles within the Texas Business Organizations Code, the
code having replaced in their entireties all of the predecessor standalone state
entity laws. These separate entity law titles state the required vote for actions by
LLCs (including the required vote for fundamental changes), but otherwise do not
address fundamental changes. Accordingly, to a great extent, the Texas model keeps
all fundamental change provisions in one place, in one title, regardless of the form of
entity.

Other states have reformed their LLC laws, including especially their fundamental
change provisions within those laws, to make them more internally consistent and
more consistent with analogous provisions across forms of entity while keeping all
36

TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 1.001 (West 2014).
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fundamental change rules within each distinct entity law statute. Florida undertook
this kind of legislative overhaul. The revisions were effective on January 1, 2014,
and effective January 1, 2015, all Florida LLCs were required to comply with the
revised LLC act.

The structure of the new act for organic transactions is a big improvement
over existing law, with the provisions for each organic transaction modeled
in the same manner (there are six sections for each of the four types of
transactions, each set in the same order and having the same descriptive
captions, with the subsections of each section in the same order). Generally,
these provisions correspond to article 10 of the uniform act, except that the
definitions (other than those dealing with appraisal rights) have been
relocated to the general definition section of the new act and the appraisal
rights provisions in the existing law have been placed at the end (the uniform
act does not contain appraisal rights).37

Changes of this nature are common as bar association groups and legislatures
struggle with how to best accomplish improvements in the evolving law of
fundamental changes for LLCs and other forms of entity without undertaking large,
time-consuming revision projects.

Louis T. M. Conti & Gregory M. Marks, Florida's New Revised LLC Act, Part IV, FLA.
B.J., March 2014, at 27, 28 (footnotes omitted).
37
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4.

CONCLUSION

The law applicable to fundamental changes in LLCs has been developing both
rapidly and continuously since the introduction of the LLC form. These changes have
not been entirely consistent from state to state. Nevertheless, they do have certain
commonalities.

Both corporate law and freedom of contract principles have influenced
developments in the legal doctrine of LLC fundamental changes. For example,
approval requirements for fundamental changes have largely moved away from
unanimity, and dissenters’ rights and a dissolution remedy for member oppression
have been grafted into LLC law from corporate law. Yet LLC statutes also have
increasingly comprised default rules that allow LLC constituents to order the affairs
of the LLC for themselves.

The corporatization of and contractarian bent to LLC law sometimes come into
conflict. Fiduciary duty law, historically a mediating factor in that conflict, threatens
to evolve toward freedom of contract norms. If taken to an extreme, this trend
would compromise fiduciary duty’s historical role as interstitial doctrine that
preserves equitable conduct in business enterprises.

Dominant corporate law rules coexist peacefully with freedom of contract norms in
the LLC response to vested rights, however. Contemporary LLC law has rejected the
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original emphasis on the vested personal property rights of business owners, earlier
eschewed under corporate law. Unanimous consent requirements for fundamental
changes have all but disappeared. In some cases, appraisal rights have arisen, as
they did under corporate law, on a mandatory or default or contractual basis. In
other cases, freedom of contract in the LLC form has completely supplanted any
vested rights previously recognized in the LLC law governing fundamental changes.

These developments put pressure on the drafting of LLC law by state legislatures.
There is wide acknowledgement of redundancies in the laws governing fundamental
changes within LLCs and as among different forms of entity and a perceived overall
need for simplification of LLC law generally and fundamental change doctrine
specifically. Model statutes and legislative initiatives offer varied approaches to LLC
law reform, and modifications to the laws governing organic transactions and other
fundamental changes have been the foundation of many of these projects.

While LLC fundamental change law has been understudied, it is important to the
development of LLC law and the overall law of business entities. Although LLC law
originally was patterned after partnership law, LLCs often operate more like
corporations in fundamental change contexts. Doctrine has developed to respond to
that fact. Having said that, the LLC law applying to fundamental changes also retains
(and in some cases has returned to or built on) the contractarian roots of LLC law,
incorporating freedom of contract principles that distinguish LLC law meaningfully
from corporate law. In this environment, state legislatures struggle with the
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complexity of and arising from changes in LLC fundamental change doctrine. Some
have begun to respond to these challenges with creative approaches to structuring
LLC law. More innovation in this respect can be expected and should be welcomed.
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